As Moldova prepares for parliamentary elections in September 2025, officials warn of escalating Russian influence operations aimed at facilitating a pro-Kremlin government that could authorize troop deployments to Transnistria. The situation combines political interference, energy coercion, and military signaling—raising the risk of a new Russian front near NATO’s southeastern border. Meanwhile, the reorganization of Wagner forces into the Africa Corps highlights Moscow’s capacity to reallocate hybrid warfare assets, reinforcing Moldova’s strategic vulnerability.
Key Takes:
- Moldova is becoming a strategic flashpoint where political influence, energy coercion, and military posturing converge. The outcome of Moldova’s September 2025 elections could redefine the security balance in southeastern Europe.
- Russia’s strategy in Moldova hinges on political subversion rather than direct military action, targeting the 2025 elections to enable a future troop deployment.
- Moldova’s 2024 EU referendum passed by a razor-thin margin, revealing a deeply divided electorate vulnerable to foreign influence.
- Up to 10,000 Russian troops could be deployed to Transnistria if a pro-Russian parliament is elected in Chișinău, according to Moldovan intelligence assesments.
- Russia’s reenactment of the 1944 Iași–Chișinău offensive served as both military signaling and psychological pressure on Moldova and NATO.
- Gas supplies to Transnistria were cut in January 2025, deepening humanitarian vulnerability and highlighting Russia’s use of energy as leverage.
- Wagner’s withdrawal from Mali and replacement by the state-controlled Africa Corps diminishes the number of troops necessary on the ground due to revised mission profiles.
- This increases the possibility of a redeployment to Eastern Europe.
September Elections in Moldova
Moldova, a small Eastern European state situated between Ukraine and EU-member Romania, finds itself at the center of mounting geopolitical friction. As the country prepares for parliamentary elections in September 2025, senior Moldovan officials have sounded alarms over what they claim is an escalating campaign by Moscow to tilt the election outcome in favor of pro-Kremlin factions. These wide-reaching hybrid operations reportedly include propaganda dissemination, vote-buying, and large-scale cash injections—totaling the equivalent of 1% of Moldova’s GDP in 2024—into opposition parties. In addition, intelligence assessments cited by both Prime Minister Dorin Recean and President Maia Sandu allege that Moscow has the intent to deploy up to 10,000 troops to the separatist region of Transnistria.
However, Moldovan authorities stress that such a deployment would likely depend on the emergence of a more Moscow-friendly government in Chișinău—one that would formally permit or facilitate Transnistria’s de facto independence, hence potentially allow an increase in Russian military presence. Transnistria, a narrow strip of territory bordering southwestern Ukraine, currently hosts approximately 1,500 Russian-affiliated troops, most of them locally recruited, operating under a contested peacekeeping mandate.
These claims follow a narrowly passed constitutional referendum in 2024 in favor of European Union (EU) membership, and an election in which President Maia Sandu secured a second term despite heavy foreign interference. While Russia has not issued any official denial and no such reinforcement has occurred to date, Moldovan authorities directly link Moscow’s alleged influence operation to the strategical advantage the deployment of Russian troops would have on the War in Donbas.
Historical Context: Transnistria
Transnistria’s de facto separation from Moldova dates back to the early 1990s, when Russian troops intervened to support local pro-USSR separatists following Moldova’s declaration of independence from the USSR. A ceasefire agreement in 1992, brokered by Moscow, has since left the region in a “frozen conflict” status, heavily dependent on Russian military, economic, and political support. Despite the lack of formal recognition by any United Nations (UN) member state, Transnistria functions with its own institutions and retains a distinctly Soviet character, both visually and institutionally.
Because the Transnistrian enclave is landlocked—bordered by Ukraine to the east and a pro-EU government in Moldova to the west—Russia currently has no viable route to send reinforcements. Neither country allows the transit of Russian military personnel or equipment through its territory, and Moldova’s limited access to the Black Sea is made via the port of Giurgiulești, under full government control, making it unsuitable for covert or large-scale military deployment.
The current Russian contingent in Transnistria secures a massive Soviet-era ammunition depot in Cobasna and maintains patrol checkpoints. Moldova has consistently called for their withdrawal, deeming the troops illegal under international law.
Tactical Signaling
In June 2025, Russian and Transnistrian forces staged a reenactment of the 1944 Soviet Iași-Chișinău offensive—a symbolic military exercise conducted near the borders of both Ukraine and NATO-member Romania. Moldovan authorities viewed this operation, conducted with live artillery and armored vehicles, as a calculated provocation and a violation of the demilitarized status of the Security Zone along the Dniester River. Moldova’s request to monitor the drill was denied, and officials warned that it served both to intimidate the Moldovan population and signal strategic intent to Ukraine and NATO.
Moldovan intelligence services assert that any significant Russian troop increase would require the compliance of a sympathetic Moldovan administration. With public opinion still divided—evidenced by the razor-thin EU referendum outcome—the upcoming elections present a critical inflection point.
Energy as Leverage: The Transnistrian Gas Cutoff
Adding to the regional complexity is a deepening energy crisis in Transnistria. On January 1, 2025, Russian gas deliveries to the enclave were cut off following the expiration of a transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine. With no new deal in place, Transnistria’s 450,000 residents have faced severe shortages of heating and hot water, particularly affecting urban apartment dwellers.
Tiraspol authorities—the de facto capital of Transnistria—activated emergency reserves for critical infrastructure like hospitals but acknowledged that supplies were very limited. The region remains dependent on stopgap electric solutions and humanitarian assistance.
This situation highlights Russia’s long-standing use of energy as a geopolitical tool, and Europe’s dependency to it. While the west of the continent has largely diversified away from Russian gas since 2022—using Liquefied Natural Gas imports from the United States and Qatar, and pipeline gas from Norway—Moldova and Transnistria remain vulnerable to energy coercion. Ukraine’s decision to cut off Russian gas exportation through its territory further isolates Transnistria and indirectly pressures Chișinău by creating an emerging humanitarian crisis that Moscow could exploit for leverage.
External Factors: Wagner’s Withdrawal and the Regional Chessboard
The confirmed withdrawal of the Private Military Company Wagner Group from Mali in mid-2025 adds another layer to the regional power recalibration.
Wagner, a key Russian paramilitary asset, had been operating in Mali since late 2021 in support of the country’s military junta, and while it played a direct combat role in battles across northern Mali, including in Kidal and Tinzaouaten, its departure does not signal the end of Russian military involvement in the region: Wagner is being replaced by the Africa Corps, a rather new paramilitary formation under the Russian Ministry of Defence and the military intelligence department.
This transition reflects a broader Kremlin effort to consolidate control over foreign paramilitary operations following Wagner’s 2023 mutiny and the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Whereas Wagner operated with considerable autonomy and offered the Kremlin plausible deniability, the Africa Corps is fully state-integrated, and is structured as a more formal force tasked with new missions such as advising, training, and securing strategic sites, rather than conducting frontline combat. This shift reduces the number of troops required on the ground, but operational continuity remains: estimates suggest that 70-80% of Africa Corps personnel are former Wagner operatives.
For regions like Moldova, this restructuring may free up experienced Russian paramilitary elements for redeployment. The integration of Wagner veterans into official state units increases the possibility of their use in other theaters—such as Eastern Europe—if strategic needs arise, particularly in scenarios involving hybrid warfare or political destabilization efforts.
Analysis and Scenarios
Russia’s approach in Moldova reflects an increasingly familiar pattern of hybrid warfare, blending military deterrence, political influence, and economic coercion to destabilize neighboring states aligned with the West and the European Union. In Moldova’s case, Moscow’s strategy appears calibrated around indirect control, seeking not to invade outright but to shape the outcome of the September 2025 parliamentary elections. Intelligence cited by Moldovan leadership suggests that the deployment of up to 10,000 troops to Transnistria would only occur if a favorable government in Chișinău grants permission—making the political battlefield more decisive than the military one.
The Kremlin’s toolkit includes disinformation campaigns, illicit financial flows, and leveraging dependency on critical infrastructure—particularly gas and electricity. The cessation of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria through Ukraine in January 2025 not only triggered a localized humanitarian crisis but also reinforced the enclave’s dependency on Russian energy—allowing Moscow to portray itself as a provider while casting Kyiv in a negative light. The disruption also underscores how energy policy and security are tightly intertwined in post-Soviet zones of influence.
Meanwhile, the use of historical military symbolism, such as the reenactment of the Soviet 1944 Iași-Chișinău offensive, serves dual purposes: signaling Russia’s enduring regional ambitions and psychologically preparing domestic and foreign audiences for a potential escalation. These symbolic moves are rarely isolated; they usually precede or accompany strategic messaging, soft power maneuvers, and force posture adjustments.
The global geopolitical climate also plays into the risk matrix: for Moldova and neighboring regions, the reorganization signals Russia’s ability to redeploy trained paramilitary personnel and resources toward other zones of influence, should geopolitical priorities shift. Russia may soon possess surplus irregular forces, and with Wagner veterans being integrated into new missions under official Russian command, the redeployment of some of these troops to Eastern Europe remains a credible possibility, especially given their prior deployment to the Luhansk and Donetsk fronts.
Looking forward, three potential scenarios emerge:
- Pessimistic Scenario (Moderate Confidence): A pro-Russian coalition wins the September elections and opens the door to formal Russian military reinforcement in Transnistria. The Kremlin rapidly increases troop presence, opening a new front against Ukraine and heightening security concerns in Romania and NATO’s southeastern corridor. EU accession talks stall, and Moldova risks political realignment.
- Intermediate Scenario (High Confidence): The current pro-European coalition retains power but with reduced legitimacy due to a close or contested election. Russian interference continues in covert forms, including cyberattacks, influence operations, and economic pressure. The military status quo in Transnistria holds, but Moldova’s domestic politics remain fragile.
- Optimistic Scenario (Low Confidence):
A decisive electoral win by pro-EU forces, supported by robust voter turnout and international monitoring, allows Moldova to consolidate democratic governance and accelerate EU integration, reducing Transnistria dependency on Russia. Russian influence wanes in the short term, and efforts to stabilize the Transnistria conflict resume diplomatically and economically, though without immediate resolution.
Conclusion
The current developments surrounding Moldova’s parliamentary elections, Russian military intentions in Transnistria, and the manipulation of energy and information flows represent a convergence of traditional and hybrid conflict strategies. While no Russian troop buildup has occurred yet, the groundwork is being laid through political subversion, regional signaling, and resource leverage. In this context, Moldova is not merely a small, overlooked state on Europe’s edge—it is a potential keystone in the evolving security architecture of Eastern Europe. The months ahead may determine whether Moldova cements its pro-European trajectory or becomes the next pressure point in Russia’s confrontation with the West.