On July 1, during a speech ahead of Belarus’ Independence Day, President Aleksandr Lukashenko announced plans to deploy several Oreshnik Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) systems to Belarus by the end of 2025, citing national defense and the prevention of internal unrest. This announcement confirmed an earlier statement by Belarus Security Council Secretary Alexander Volfovich on May 28.
The Oreshnik is an experimental IRBM that Russia claims can evade advanced air defense systems. Believed to be a derivative of the RS-26 “Rubezh” missile, with an estimated range exceeding 3,000 kilometers, the Oreshnik made its operational debut on November 21, 2024, in a strike on the Pivdenmach defense-industrial facility in Dnipro. While allegedly capable of carrying a nuclear payload, the missile delivered six reentry vehicles in this case, each containing six inert submunitions.
While much about the Oreshnik remains classified, available evidence suggests it provides Russia with a highly mobile, high-speed delivery platform for both conventional and strategic payloads, designed to complicate interception and maximize impact.
However, several operational details remain uncertain regarding the deployment of Russian missiles in Belarus: although President Vladimir Putin has stated that mass production is underway, US officials believe Russia currently possesses only a small number of these missiles. Additionally, Minsk had already agreed to host Russian tactical nuclear weapons, reportedly transferred in October 2023, but Ukrainian intelligence maintains that the delivery systems currently in place lack nuclear warheads. Finally, Ukraine has demonstrated increasing success with long-range US-supplied ATACMS missiles, striking military sites within Russian territory, prompting Moscow’s response with Oreshnik.
The strategic implications for the War in Donbas are mixed. The forward deployment of Oreshnik systems in Belarus shortens the time-to-target for strikes on Ukrainian territory, complicating Kyiv’s missile defense planning. The opening of a second launch front also forces Ukraine to monitor an additional axis and stretch its air defense and surveillance resources. In addition, stationing such weapons closer to Ukraine sends a clear political and military signal intended to intimidate, even if the actual strike capability remains unchanged. Finally, in the event of escalation with NATO, a Belarusian launch site would offer an improved geographic access to Central and Eastern Europe, expanding potential strike range to other member of the Organization.